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Abstract
Recent immigrants tend to locate in ethnic ”enclaves” within metropolitan areas. The
economic consequence of living in such enclaves is still an unresolved issue. We use an
immigrant policy initiative in Sweden, when government authorities distributed refugee
immigrants across locales in a way that may be considered exogenous. This policy
initiative provides a unique natural experiment, which allows us to estimate the causal
effect on labor market outcomes of living in enclaves. We find substantive evidence of
sorting across locations. When sorting is taken into account, living in enclaves improves
labor market outcomes; for instance, the earnings gain associated with a standard
deviation increase in ethnic concentration is in the order of four to five percent.
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1.  Introduction
In most countries, immigrants tend to be spatially concentrated. In the US, for instance,
recent immigrants often reside in ethnic enclaves, usually located in metropolitan areas;
see LaLonde and Topel (1991). Another example is Sweden, where the share of the
foreign-born population living in the three largest metropolitan areas outstripped the
share of the native population by 18 percentage points in 1997.1 This paper deals with
the economic consequences of living in these enclaves.
There are many potential explanations for this location pattern:2 economic incentives
may dictate that new immigrants use the established networks of previous immigrants;
it may also reflect the importance of ethnic ties per se, discrimination in the housing
market, or the rational response to imperfect information.3
A fairly large, and predominantly American, literature has examined the individual
consequences of living in enclaves (or “ghettos”/“neighborhoods”). Cutler and Glaeser
(1997), for instance, find that blacks living in segregated areas have significantly worse
outcomes than blacks in integrated areas. The earnings effects are sizable: a one
standard deviation increase of segregation reduces the earnings of blacks relative to
whites by 7–9 percent.
The early studies concerning the effects of segregation on individual outcomes − Kain
(1968) is the seminal paper − estimated the effects treating the ethnic composition of an
area within a city as exogenous. The results from this type of studies, however, are
susceptible to Tiebout bias, arising because individuals choose in which community to
reside. As Evans et al. (1992) illustrate, statistically significant neighborhood (“peer
group”) effects may disappear if proper account is taken to the fact that there is scope
for choosing the neighborhood.4
Later studies, e.g. Cutler and Glaeser (1997), have utilized the variation across
                                               
1 The 25 largest metropolitan areas of the US hosted 75% of the immigrant population and 40% of the native
population. 53% of the immigrant population and 35% of the native population lived in the three largest
metropolitan areas of Sweden in 1997.
2 Bartel (1989) has shown that immigrants in the US choose to reside in regions where there are other
immigrants. Moreover, their location decisions are less sensitive to wage variations in comparison to the
native population.
3 In the absence of other information on job market opportunities, new immigrants may use the location of
previous immigrants as an indicator of labor market prospects.
4 Manski (1993) has even questioned whether it is possible to identify the peer group effect.IFAU – Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 3
metropolitan areas, arguing that Tiebout sorting is less problematic in this case.5 Yet
another approach to this issue is to use parental choices of neighborhoods, where the
assumption is that this choice is exogenous with respect to the outcome of the offspring;
Borjas (1995) is an example.
Although we agree that these later approaches may have reduced simultaneity
problems, we still think that the validity of the implicit exogeneity assumptions is an
open question. In the US, for instance, moves for non-housing reasons constitute almost
40 percent of total mobility; Greenwood (1997). The assumption of no sorting across local
labor markets means that these moves are not the response of, say, individuals whose
labor market prospects are threatened by an influx of immigrants. Indeed the US
evidence suggests that increased immigration mostly hurt previous immigrants rather
than natives; see LaLonde and Topel (1997). Therefore, we believe that the individual
consequences of living in enclaves are still an unresolved issue.
We take a different approach. Our exogenous source of variation comes from a
Swedish government policy concerning the initial location of refugee immigrants. This
policy was viable between 1985 and 1991. Government authorities placed refugees in
localities that were deemed suitable according to certain criteria. Initially, these criteria
were supposed to be related to factors like educational and labor market opportunities.
In practice, however, the availability of housing seems to have been the all-important
factor. Our maintained hypothesis is that the policy change implied that the initial
location of immigrants was independent of unobservable individual characteristics.
Hence, this “natural experiment” enables us to reexamine the question of the economic
consequences of living in enclaves.6
The government settlement policy had real consequences for immigrant location. This
is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the share of the immigrant inflow and stock that
resides in Stockholm and the north of Sweden respectively. Prior to 1985, refugees were
allowed to settle in a neighborhood of their own liking. In 1985, the immigrant shares in
Stockholm and the north of Sweden stood at 36 and 5 percent respectively. By 1991, the
share living in Stockholm had been reduced by more than 3 percentage points, while the
                                               
5 Bertrand et al. (2000), Dustmann and Preston (1998), and Gabriel and Rosenthal (1999) make analogous
arguments.
6 Katz et al. (2000) uses a similar approach.IFAU –Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 4
share residing in the north increased by 2 percentages. Thus, the policy initiative clearly
increased the dispersion of immigrants across Sweden.
Figure 1: Share of non-OECD immigrant inflow (solid) and stock (dashed) located in

























Notes: “Stockholm” refers to the county of Stockholm, “North” to the six northernmost counties of Sweden.
Own calculations using the LINDA immigrant sample.
Our results can briefly be summarized as follows. We find pervasive evidence of
sorting across local labor markets. The coefficients on municipality characteristics,
which is the level at which our measures of, e.g., enclaves pertain, differ rather
drastically between estimates that account for sorting and those that do not. For
example, estimates that suffer from sorting bias associate an (insignificant) earnings
loss of 1.0 percent with a standard deviation increase in ethnic concentration. Our
baseline estimates that do not suffer from this problem suggest a significant earnings
increase of 4.2 percent.
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. By way of background, section 2
compares the Swedish and US experience with respect to immigration and ethnic
concentration. Section 3 gives a description of the institutional setting and discusses
whether we can treat the policy shift in 1985 as a natural experiment. In section 4, we
outline a simple framework that we use as a guide to specification and interpretation.
Sections 5 and 6 turn to the empirical analyses. We focus on two outcome measures:IFAU – Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 5
earnings and idleness. We use longitudinal micro data derived from the database
LINDA; see Edin and Fredriksson (2000). Section 7 concludes.
2.  Immigration and clustering: Sweden and the US
The purpose of this section is to put immigration to Sweden into perspective. To
accomplish this objective we compare the Swedish immigration experience during the
past thirty years with that of the US. The US is a natural point of reference since it is
the most extensively documented country in the literature. The Swedish figures are
calculated from LINDA. The US numbers are mostly taken from Borjas (1999).
Relative to the size of each country, the immigrant stock in Sweden is greater than
that of the US – a country that is sometimes referred to as “a nation of immigrants”. In
1997, 11 percent of the Swedish population was foreign-born. By comparison, 10 percent
of the US population was foreign-born in 1998. The growth of the immigrant population
has, however, been somewhat lower in Sweden during the past thirty years: while the
immigrant share of the US more than doubled between 1970 and 1998, it grew by
around 60 percent in Sweden between 1970 and 1997.7
The past thirty years has seen a radical shift in the ethnic composition of
immigration to Sweden. In 1970, immigrants of Nordic descent constituted 60 percent of
the foreign-born population; by 1997, the share of Nordic immigrants had been halved.
Since the mid-1980s immigration is predominantly for political reasons.
Sweden shares the experience of a shift in the ethnic composition of immigrants with
many other industrialized countries. Over two thirds of legal immigration to the US was
from Europe or Canada during the 1950s. By the 1990s less than 17 percent were of
European or Canadian origin.
Associated with the shift in the ethnic composition of the immigrant stock is a decline
in the relative skill of the foreign-born population. Male immigrant earnings declined
from 95 percent relative to male native earnings in 1970 to 88 percent in 1997.8 During
the same time period, relative earnings of a male immigrant of Nordic descent increased
                                               
7 The growth rate of the immigrant to population ratio was dramatically higher during the 1960s, when it
grew by 65% in a single decade.
8 Concomitantly, relative rates of non-participation among male immigrants increased from 1.5 times to 2.3
times the rate of native non-participation. When calculating relative immigrant earnings we applied a lower
earnings limit corresponding to the minimum amount of earnings that qualifies to the earnings related part
of the public pension system. In 1997, this amount was 36,300 SEK.IFAU –Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 6
from 92 to 97 percent. In the US, there has been a similar decline in the relative skill of
immigrants: in 1960 the average immigrant male earned 4 percent more than the
corresponding native; by 1998, this had been turned into an earnings deficit of 23
percent.
As noted in the introduction, immigrants are concentrated to metropolitan areas to a
larger extent than natives. In 1997, 53 percent of immigrants lived in the three largest
local labor markets in Sweden (Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö), which host only 35
percent of the native population.9 By comparison, the 25 largest metropolitan areas of
the US hosted 75 percent of the immigrant population and 40 percent of the native
population; see LaLonde and Topel (1991). In 1998, almost three-quarters of immigrants
lived in only six US states (Borjas, 2000).
It is well known that immigrants to the US tend to live in ethnic enclaves. Borjas
(1998) has calculated a simple measure of the probability of residing in an “ethnic
neighborhood”. An ethnic neighborhood is defined as a neighborhood where the share of
the ethnic group in the resident population is at least twice as large as the share of the
ethnic group in the US population. According to this measure, 48 percent of an average
member of an ethnic group resided in an enclave in 1979; see Borjas (1999). Ethnic
concentration seems to be particularly high among immigrants from non-industrialized
countries: e.g. Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans.10
We have calculated this measure for our sample of first generation immigrants. It
turns out that 42 percent of the average first generation immigrant lives in an ethnic
neighborhood in 1997. Among the top ten source countries, the probability of living in an
enclave is particularly high among immigrants from Turkey, Iraq, and Iran.11 Thus,
ethnic concentration is a feature of the Swedish immigration experience. Further,
immigrants from developing countries are more likely to reside in enclaves.12
                                               
9 The definition of a local labor market is roughly comparable to a US Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area (SMSA).
10 An ethnic group is defined in terms ethnic ancestry and, hence, many generations of immigrants.
Neighborhoods are defined in terms of area zip codes. The calculations are based on the NLSY.
11 The top ten source countries in 1997 (ordered by their size) were Finland, the former Yugoslavia, Iran,
Norway, Poland, Denmark, (East and West) Germany, Iraq, Turkey, and the former Soviet Union.
12 For the purpose of this calculation, neighborhoods were defined in terms of parishes. The average size of a
parish approximately corresponds to the average size of a US Census tract.IFAU – Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 7
3.  The placement policy
The objective of this section is to give the reader a practical sense about the workings of
the placement policy. For our purposes we want the actual placement to be independent
of any unobservable characteristics in our outcome equations. To what extent is this
true? Were some individuals more likely placed than others?
Unfortunately, there is very little documentation about the practical implementation
of the placement policy. Therefore, we have partly approached the issues by
interviewing placement officers and other officials of the Immigration Board.
We begin by giving a brief account of the institutional setting. We then proceed to
describe the handling of a typical asylum seeker from the border to the final placement.
3.1  The institutional setting13
In 1985, handling refugee issues in Sweden became the formal responsibility of the
Swedish Immigration Board, and the national government took a more important role in
the handling of refugee immigrants.14 The Immigration Board assigned immigrants to a
municipality of residence. Municipal authorities, in turn, assigned immigrants to an
apartment. Reception in the municipalities was regulated in agreements between the
Board and the municipality in question. After receiving a residence permit, the refugee
was to stay in the municipality for an introductory period of about 18 months.15 This
initial phase, among other things, involved introductory courses in Swedish.
Two aspects of the assignment strategy should be noted. First, the strategy only
pertained to the initial location. There were no restrictions against relocating if
individuals could find a place on their own. However, mobility implied the loss of
eligibility for some of the special introduction activities granted in the assigned
municipality. In particular, the immigrant had to await a new place in a language
course. Second, not all political immigrants became enrolled in the Immigration Board’s
asylum reception. During 1985–91, a fifth of the inflow of political immigrants was
family members who traveled directly to a municipality, where the remainder of the
                                               
13 This section draws primarily on The Committee on Immigration Policy (1996) and The Immigration
Board (1997).
14 In practice, the Immigration Board started handling refugee issues during a trial period in the autumn of
1984.
15 The length of the introduction period appears to have varied across municipalities and years; in many
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family resided.
The reform was a reaction to the concentration of immigrants to large cities that had
taken place. The idea was to distribute asylum seekers over a larger number of
municipalities that had suitable characteristics for reception, such as educational and
labor market opportunities. At first, the intention was to sign contracts with about 60
municipalities, but due to the increasing number of asylum seekers in the late 1980s, a
larger number became involved; in 1989, 277 out of Sweden’s 284 municipalities
participated. It was considered a virtue if every Swedish municipality took its share of
immigrants. The advantages of smaller communities in terms of closeness between
people were emphasized, but the factors that initially were supposed to govern the
choice of location were more or less abandoned. Instead, the availability of housing
became the deciding factor.
Formally, the policy of assigning refugees to municipalities was in place from 1985 to
1994. In 1994, a new law was passed that gave immigrants the right to choose the
initial place of residence provided that they could find an apartment on their own.16
However, the strictness of the placement policy gradually eroded during 1992–94, when
there was an immigration peak caused by the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For our
purposes, the post-1991 period is less attractive, since it contained larger degrees of
freedom for the individual immigrant to choose the initial place of residence.
The strictest application of the assignment policy was between 1987 and 1991. In
1988, a new law was passed which required “extraordinary reasons” for all others than
family members to get the right to stay in a municipality instead of a refugee center
while waiting for a residence permit.17 In effect, it seems that the law formalized a
stricter practice, which had been introduced in 1987. During 1987–91, the placement
rate, i.e., the fraction of refugee immigrants assigned an initial municipality of residence
by the Immigration Board, was close to 90 percent.
3.2  A typical case of asylum – the placement policy in practice 1987–91
An asylum seeker was placed in a refugee center while waiting for a decision from the
                                               
16 From then on more than 50 percent of the immigrants have used this opportunity. The Immigration
Board has placed the remainder of the immigrants.
17 This was a tightening of regulations in the following sense. Prior to the change, refugees could stay in a
municipality of their own choice while waiting for a residence permit and, in general, the chance of being
assigned the municipality of residence was greater than being assigned another municipality.IFAU – Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 9
immigration authorities. Refugee centers were distributed all over Sweden and there
was no correlation between the port of entry and the location of the center. However,
immigrants were sorted by native language when placed in centers.
There was a long wait for a residence permit. The mean duration between entry into
Sweden and the receipt of a permit (conditional on receipt) varied between 3 and 12
months during 1987–91; see Rooth (1999). Notice that whether individuals were
subjected to the placement policy or not depended solely on when they received their
residence permits. So an individual entering in 1986, but receiving the permit in 1987,
was placed according to the practice in 1987. There was a much shorter wait for a
municipal placement after receiving the permit, partly because placement officers had
explicit goals in terms of the duration of this spell.
When it came to the municipal placement, weight was given to immigrant
preferences. Most immigrants, of course, applied for residence in the traditional
immigrant cities of Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö. There were very few apartment
vacancies in these locations, however, in particular during the second half of the 1980s
when the housing market was booming. When the number of applicants exceeded the
number of available slots, municipal officers may have selected the “best” immigrants.
There was no interaction between municipal officers and refugees, so the selection was
purely in terms of observable characteristics; language, formal qualifications, and family
size seem to have been the governing criteria. When the municipalities could “cream
skim”, they selected highly educated individuals and individuals that spoke the same
language as some members of the resident immigrant stock. Single individuals were
particularly difficult to place, since small apartments were extremely scarce.
After having been assigned to an apartment, immigrants’ main source of income was
welfare (i.e. social assistance). They could live on welfare while participating in
introductory Swedish courses. Receipt of welfare was not conditional on residing in the
assigned municipality and the central government reimbursed the local governments for
their welfare expenditures. So there was little incentive for the immigrants to stay on in
an assigned municipality, if they could realize their preferred choice. The main
individual cost, apart from moving costs, consisted of delayed enrollment in introductory
language courses.IFAU –Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 10
3.3  The placement policy as a natural experiment
On the basis of the above description, we think that it is realistic to treat the municipal
assignment as exogenous with respect to the random components of the outcomes of
interest, conditional on observed characteristics. For highly qualified individuals this
assumption is potentially more problematic. Cream skimming on the part of municipal
officers suggests that the high-skilled may have been able to realize their preferred
option.18
The strictest application of the assignment policy was between 1987 and 1991. We
have chosen to base our empirical work on placements during the 1987–89 period. The
last year is an obvious choice, since the probability of being “exogenously” placed is
increasing in the total inflow of residence permits and the tightness of the housing
market. There was a hike in the number of new residence permits in 1989, and the
housing market peaked in that year. Given the choice of 1989 we can follow individuals
for a maximum of eight years. To increase the size of the sample we added two
additional years. We chose 1987 and 1988 since we wanted to follow individuals over
time for as long as possible.19
4.  A stylized framework
The purpose of this section is to present a simple model, which we think is a useful
framework of thought. Although we examine different outcomes in our empirical
analysis we focus here on the simultaneous determination of location and earnings. We
begin by examining the bias of the OLS estimator. We then present the conditions that
render different estimation approaches consistent. Throughout we keep the conditioning
on observed characteristics (apart from location) implicit. To illustrate our main points
we adapt the schooling model of Card (1999) to our setting.
4.1  The bias of ordinary least squares
Consider an immigrant who derives utility from living with other immigrants and the
                                               
18 Below, we provide some evidence on this issue. On the whole, rates of post-placement mobility do not
suggest that the highly qualified were more likely to exercise their preferred option when being assigned to
a municipality.
19 As a guide to the selection of years we calculated the ratio of the inflow of residence permits and the stock
of vacant public rental apartments. This ratio stood at 10 in 1989; in 1988 and 1990, it equaled 4, and in
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consumption of goods. The immigrant maximizes utility by making a location choice,
where each location is characterized by some measure of immigrant density (m). For
simplicity we assume that there is a continuum of location choice where m spans the
real line between zero and unity:  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ m . Utility is given by
i i i i y m u U ln ) ( + = (1)
The objective of the individual is to maximize (1) subject to a market opportunity locus:
i i i i m y β α + = ln (2)
where  i α  reflects general aptitudes in the labor market and  i β  is the marginal return of
living in an enclave – or the aptitude for enclaving. The first-order condition is
0 = + ′ i i u β . To proceed, assume that the marginal utility of living in an enclave is linear
in m, i.e.,  km u i i − = ′ µ , where k is a positive constant. With this assumption we have








Now, let us revert to the earnings equation. Rewrite this relationship as follows:
i i i i i i i m m m y η β α β β α) α β α + + = − + − + + = ) ( ( ln (4)
Our interest concerns the parameter  β – the average return to living in an enclave.
(Throughout we choose the convention that non-indexed variables are population
averages.) Consider the OLS estimate of equation (4). The probability limit of the OLS
estimate,  OLS b , is
m bOLS 1 0 plim λ λ β + + = (5)
The parameters  j λ  are theoretical regression coefficients:  ) var( ) , cov( 0 i i i m m α λ =  and
                                               
20 In order to avoid digressing into details we do not discuss the possibility of corner solutions.IFAU –Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 12
) var( ) , cov( 1 i i i m m β λ = , where  i m  is given by (3). Assuming that the underlying
random variables,  i i i µ β α   and   , , , have some joint and symmetric distribution, the
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The coefficient  0 λ  signifies ability bias, while  1 λ  is related to bias because of
self-selection.
In general, we cannot say much about the sign of the bias, but it is instructive to walk
through some special cases. We will consider four such cases: (a) homogeneity in the
return to enclaving  β β = i ; (b) location decisions are based on expectations of income but
ex post returns differ across individuals, i.e.  β β = i  in (3); (c) preference homogeneity
µ µ = i ; and (d) preferences are independent of aptitudes  0 = = αµ βµ σ σ .






k bias = (7a)
The sign of the bias depends on the correlation between general aptitudes and
preferences. Absent any such correlation OLS is unbiased; random variation of
preferences then effectively trace out the structural earnings equation (2). In general, of
course, } sign{ } { sign αµ σ = bias , but it is difficult to have a concrete prior about  αµ σ .
(b) Ex ante homogeneity but ex post heterogeneity in  i β . This case is similar to (a) in the
sense that the bias of OLS is a function of the statistical dependence between









                                               
21 Symmetry is imposed since then we do not have to worry about moments of the third order.IFAU – Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 13
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where ρ is the correlation between ability and the monetary pay-off of living in an
enclave. If there is no such correlation OLS is biased upwards; those who gain most
from living in enclaves choose to do so; the bias is thus purely due to self-selection.
However, we believe that  0 < ρ  is a realistic assumption, i.e., those who do poorly on the
labor market for unobservable reasons are those who with the highest return to
enclaving. One argument for this belief would be that network effects are more
important for individuals of low general aptitude. If  0 < ρ , OLS may plausibly be biased
downwards.

























i.e., the bias is proportional to, but lower than in, case (c).
Suppose that we can obtain a consistent estimate of  β. Can we say anything useful
about the sign of the unknown covariances? If  ) (
2
βµ β σ σ − > , the bias due to self-selection
( 1 λ ) is positive. Since this seems like an innocuous assumption, we will impose it. As it
turns out, there is one informative and one uninformative case. The informative case is
when OLS is downward biased, since then  0 } sign{ } sign{ 0 < + = αβ αµ σ σ λ . If  0 = αβ σ , this
implies that those of less general aptitude derive greater utility from enclaving. If
0 = αµ σ , low-ability individuals have a greater return to living in an enclave.
4.2  On the estimation of the outcome equations
What kind of assumptions do we need in order to estimate the average return to living
in an enclave consistently? In practice, we have two estimation alternatives − an IV or a
control function approach. For our instrument to be of any use it is clear that it must be
independent of the random coefficients in (4). Let us denote our instrument, the initialIFAU –Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 14
placement, by 
0
i m . Then we assume that
[ ] [ ] 0 ( (
0 0 = − = − i i i i m E m E β) β α) α (8)
We also impose an exclusion restriction in the sense that only variables associated with
the current location have an effect on earnings.
Given the above assumptions, two questions arise: What does (linear) instrumental
variables estimate? Under what conditions does IV estimate the average return to living
in an enclave consistently? These questions have given rise to a scholarly debate; the
essence of the debate can be found in Angrist et al. (1996) and Heckman (1997).
An application of IV to a setting that is similar to ours is given in Angrist (1990). He
used the Vietnam draft lottery to estimate the effect of military service on earnings. An
IV estimate of the effect of military service on earnings then is a weighted average of
individual “treatment effects” for those whose military service status was changed
because of the value of instrument – i.e. for those who were “compliers”.22 Notice that: (i)
individuals who would have enrolled in the military irrespective of their lottery number
do not contribute to identification; (ii) the interpretation of the IV estimand does not
hinge on linearity of the relationships of interest; and (iii) the group of compliers need
not be representative of the population.
The fact that compliers need not be representative of the population is the basis for
Heckman’s criticism of (linear) IV estimation of models with variable treatment effects.
He argues that being a complier involves a choice, which partly may be based on the
unobservable earnings gains of going into the military. If this is the case, the average
causal response among compliers is not representative of the average treatment effect
(ATE) in the population. A control function approach, on the other hand, provides
consistent estimates of ATE even if there is selection on unobservable earnings gains,
subject to imposing some additional structure.
Let us provide more substance to our informal discussion. Given (8), the consistency
of IV requires  κ β β = − ] ) ( [
0
i i i m m E , where κ is constant and independent of 
0
i m ; see
Wooldridge (1997). Let 
* 0 ) 1 ( i i i i i m s m s m − + = , where  1 = i s  if the individual stayed on in
                                               
22 For this weighted average to be well-defined a monotonicity assumption is required. Monotonicity means
that getting a lottery number that implied eligibility for draft should not decrease the probability of serving
in the military and vice versa. If monotonicity holds, the weights sum to unity.IFAU – Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 15
the assigned location,  0 = i s  for the complementary event, and 
* m  is given by (3). Then
IV requires that
κ β β
β β β β
= = = − +
= = − = −
) 0 Pr( ] 0 , ) ( [
) 1 Pr( ] 1 , ) ( [ ] ) ( [
0 0
0 0 0
i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i
m s s m m E
m s s m m E m m E
(9)
We first note that the probability of staying will generally depend on 
0
i m .23 Hence, IV
needs that the conditional means of (9) are either equal to zero, or that the two terms in
(9) are equal in magnitude but of opposite sign. The conditional means will equal zero if
there is no sorting on comparative advantage ( i β ) or information correlated with it. In
terms of the special cases considered in section 4.1, IV estimates the average treatment
effect if the return to enclaving is homogeneous in the population (case a), and when
there is ex ante homogeneity but ex post heterogeneity in β (case b), provided that
0 = βµ σ . However, as soon as there is self-selection by comparative advantage (cases c)
and d) IV estimation is problematic and requires special assumptions in order to be
consistent.
So where does this leave us? Should we use an IV or a control function approach? Our
strategy is to use both methods. The advantage of linear IV is its robustness; it gives a
weighted average of treatment effects for compliers. Without further restrictions this is
all the data can be informative about. If we are willing to impose some additional
structure (such as linearity in the outcome equation and a specific error structure) we
can apply selection correction methods to estimate ATE. Subject to this additional
structure, the implicit behavioral (or informational) assumption of IV is, in principle,
testable.24
5.  Consequences of the reform: mobility and concentration
In this section we give a quantitative picture of how the policy reform affected
subsequent mobility and location patterns. Subsequent mobility is a natural indicator of
                                               
23 The indicator variable s equals  } ) )( ( {
0 0
i i i i i i c m m m U I s ≤ − = , where I is the indicator function and  i c
denotes the cost of mobility. Using (3) this equals  } ) ( {
2 0
i i i i c m m k I s ≤ − = . There are two cases where the
probability of staying does not depend on the assigned municipality. One is when there are no mobility
costs. In this instance, however, the rank condition fails, given our maintained assumption that the initial
placement is exogenous to unobserved individual characteristics. The second example is if mobility costs are
given by 
2 0) ( i i i i m m c − = δ  and so  } { i i k I s δ ≤ = .
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how immigrants perceived their initial placement. We also want to make sure that the
policy initiative actually affected residential location in the longer run. If not, the initial
placement will not have much predictive value for current region of residence.
5.1  Data and sample selection
The empirical analysis is based on data from the LINDA database. Among other things,
LINDA contains a panel of around 20 percent of the foreign-born population. Moreover,
the data are cross-sectionally representative. Data are available from 1960 and
onwards, and are based on a combination of income tax registers, population censuses
and other sources; for more details, see Edin and Fredriksson (2000).
We cannot identify refugee immigrants directly from our data. Instead we identify
them by country of origin. As a general rule we include immigrants from countries
outside Western Europe that were not members of the OECD as of 1985. The only
exception from this rule is Turkey, which is included since it was the origin of a
substantial inflow of refugee immigrants during the period. Furthermore, persons
belonging to a household with either a Swedish-born grown-up or a previous immigrant
were excluded, since these individuals were likely to have immigrated as family
members and, consequently, are not “program participants”. We also apply an age
restriction and base our analysis on individuals aged 18–55 at the time of entry into
Sweden. Lastly, we focus on the immigration waves during 1987–89 for reasons outlined
above.
Another feature of the data that is relevant for our analysis is that we observe
individuals’ region of residence at the end of the year. Thus, the observed initial location
may differ from the actual initial placement when individuals move during their first
year. This introduces a measurement error in initial placement, an issue we will return
to when assessing the stability of our estimates.
5.2  Consequences of the reform
In order to give a quantitative view of how the placement policy affected the location
pattern of recent immigrants it is necessary to construct a counterfactual. For this
purpose, we choose individuals who are identified as refugee immigrants (according to
the above criteria) during the years 1981–83. We use these two samples of immigrants,IFAU – Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 17
1981–83 and 1987–89, to illustrate differences in initial and subsequent location
patterns and secondary mobility.
Since we want to use the 1981/83 cohort as an approximation of the counterfactual
for the 1987/89 cohort, it is vital that the cohorts are similar in terms of observable and
unobservable characteristics. With respect to observable characteristics, there were no
important differences in terms of age and education. The representative individual of
the 1987/89 cohort was 0.6 years older and had 0.2 years more of imputed years of
education.
The difference between the two cohorts in terms of ethnicity is a greater source of
concern. It is well known that ethnicity is an important determinant of success in the
receiving country; ethnicity is important as it influences language skills and the level of
formal education varies by origin country (Borjas, 1994). The chief discrepancy between
the two cohorts is that the 1981/83 cohort has more of the mass among immigrants from
Eastern Europe. The later cohort, by contrast, has the greatest fraction of immigrants
originating from the Middle East.25
To us the differences in terms of region of origin seem substantial. To generate the
counterfactual location distribution for the 1987/89 cohort, we reweigh observations in
the 1981/83 cohort such that the distribution over region of origin conforms to the
1987/89 cohort. Whenever we talk about differences across cohorts in the sequel, we
refer to the differences between the 1987/89 cohort and the weighted 1981/83 cohort.
One indicator of how immigrants perceived the reform is post-immigration mobility.
If a consequence of the government policy was that immigrants were placed in regions
that they deemed inferior, we should observe greater mobility in the 1987/89 cohort in
comparison to the earlier cohort. The prediction that mobility should be greater in the
program cohort is clearly contingent on immigrants being able to choose/identify their
most preferred region upon arrival. There are plausible reasons why this might not be
the case. For one thing, there is probably genuine uncertainty about the regional
variation in the pay-off to labor market skills and, hence, the answer to this question is
                                               
25 The share of refugee immigrants from Eastern Europe declined from 37 percent (1981/83) to 18 percent
(1987/89), while the share from the Middle East increased from 23 to 46 percent. The increase in refugee
immigration from the Middle East is mainly due to the war between Iran and Iraq. The large share of
Eastern Europeans in the earlier cohort is due to a substantial inflow of immigrants from Poland in 1982,
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not obvious.
We start by comparing mobility across the two cohorts; see Table 1. We note that,
mobility is substantial in both cohorts. Around 50 percent chose to move from their
initial location. Moreover, there are some differences between the cohorts.26 The
probability of remaining in the initial location is lower among those who were assigned a
municipality by government authorities; the propensities to emigrate are roughly equal,
but there is more internal mobility in the 1987/89 cohort.
Table 1: Individuals who stayed, emigrated, and relocated, percent.
Immigrant cohort
1981/83 1987/89




Notes: Refugee immigrants aged 18–55 at immigration. Probability of emigration equals probability of not
being in sample (i.e. the figures include deceased). t denotes year of immigration. Observations in the
1981/83 cohort weighted to correspond to the (period t) region-of-origin distribution in the 1987/89 cohort.
Table 2: Location patterns by population density, percent.
Immigrant cohort
1981/83 1987/89
tt +8 tt +8
Region 1 (Stockholm) 48.0 52.3 25.0 33.6
Region 2 (Göteborg & Malmö) 15.3 18.0 16.2 25.6
Region 3 29.2 24.3 31.4 29.5
Region 4 6.4 4.1 17.7 8.5
Region 5 0.8 0.9 3.4 1.7
Region 6 (Sparsely populated) 0.3 0.4 6.3 1.1
Notes: Refugee immigrants aged 18–55 at immigration. “Region 1” most densely populated; “Region 6” least
densely populated. t denotes year of immigration. Observations in the 1981/83 cohort weighted to
correspond to the region-of-origin distribution in the 1987/89 cohort.
Thus, post-immigration mobility seems to be high; this is true for both cohorts. To
what kinds of regions did the immigrants move? We investigate this question in Table 2.
As we have noted, the policy reform was a reaction to the concentration of the foreign-
born to metropolitan areas, primarily Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö. As a
consequence of the reform, we should expect a shift in the initial location pattern in
favor of sparsely populated areas, often located in the northern part of Sweden.
                                               
26 To examine whether these numbers are driven by an overall increase in the probability of relocation, we
have also calculated difference-in-difference estimates relative to a sample of natives. The difference
between the cohorts is moderated slightly. Given the similarity between the before-and-after and difference-
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Table 2, which tabulates region of residence according to population density, shows
that the distribution of initial location across the two cohorts is radically different.
There is concentration over time in both cohorts, although much more pronounced in the
1987/89 cohort. Nevertheless, there is far from total convergence of the two
distributions. Thus, it seems that the reform did have lasting effects on location. A
tabulation of municipalities by geographical location conveys a similar message, with
one proviso: mobility is not just from a desolated North to the populous South, but also
to the regional centers in the north of Sweden.
So, in line with our expectations, there is more mobility and concentration among
immigrants who were assigned a municipality by government authorities.27
Nonetheless, two additional facts are striking to us. First, there is also a lot of mobility
in the cohort that was supposedly free to choose, suggesting that informational problems
may be of some importance. Second, eight years after entry to Sweden, the post-reform
distribution of immigrants has far from converged to the pre-reform distribution of
immigrants.
An important question is whether some groups were less likely to be placed than
other groups. Our account of the workings of the assignment policy suggests that less
qualified individuals may have been able to realize their preferred choice to a lesser
extent than the highly skilled. An analogous argument holds for singles.
One natural avenue to examine these hypotheses is to look at migration propensities
by education and family status. If the above hypotheses are correct we should expect
greater mobility among the less educated than among the highly educated as a
consequence of the reform, and likewise for singles in comparison to couples. With
respect to education we find no evidence in favor of the hypothesis – on the contrary:
difference-in-difference estimates suggest that the reform increased the relative
relocation rates of individuals with a university degree. Moreover, we found no
differences according to family or marital status.
                                               
27 In related work we have examined subsequent mobility in closer detail. It turns out that much of the raw
difference in mobility between the two cohorts disappears when it is standardized with respect to individual
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6.  The effects of living in enclaves
In this section we estimate the effect that living in ethnic enclaves has on economic
outcomes. We begin by offering a brief account of the literature on why enclaves could
affect outcomes. Then we present a set of baseline estimates that deliver the gist of the
results. Finally, we subject the baseline estimates to a comprehensive set of
specification checks. We wish to emphasize from the start that the conclusion from these
checks is that, if anything, the baseline estimates understate the value of enclaves.
6.1  Why does living in enclaves affect outcomes?
The purpose of this section is to give a brief review of the literature on why enclaves
influence the outcomes of individuals living there. We consider four types of
explanations: (i) slower rate of acquisition of host country skills; (ii) “network effects”;
(iii) “spatial mismatch”; and (iv) human capital externalities.28 Although we present
each explanation separately, they are not mutually exclusive.
The hypothesis that the enclave decreases the rate of host country skill acquisition
seems to have been among the prime motives for the reform that we are utilizing.
According to this view, the ethnic enclave provides less interaction with natives and
reduces the incentives for acquiring, e.g., the language skills that are necessary to
succeed in the national labor market. Thus, the enclave hinders the move to better jobs
and reduces earnings in the longer run.
More of a positive view is contained in stories that emphasize network effects. The
enclave represents a network that increases the opportunities for gainful trade in the
labor market; e.g. Portes (1987) and Lazear (1999). Further, the network disseminates
valuable information on, e.g., job opportunities, and constitutes an environment where
the immigrant is less exposed to the discrimination encountered elsewhere on the labor
market. The enclave would thus improve labor market outcomes, in particular for recent
immigrants and for individuals who have difficulty integrating into the labor market. Of
course, the enclave may also provide information on matters that are not conducive to
                                               
28 To this list one could potentially add relative factor supplies and compensating differentials. This story
would go as follows. If the typical immigrant has preferences for living with members of his own ethnic
group, then he is willing to pay a price for living in that area. The price corresponds to the movement along
the labor demand curve as labor supply increases. The equilibrium sorting of individuals will feature a
negative correlation between wages and ethnic concentration. The correlation is simply due to preferences
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success in the labor market, such as welfare eligibility; e.g., Bertrand et al. (2000).
The spatial mismatch hypothesis emphasizes discrimination in the housing market;
see Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998). Since immigrants face restrictions in the housing
market they are forced to segregate in an enclave. The enclave, in turn, may be distant
from areas that provide employment opportunities. Therefore, individuals living in the
enclave will fare worse than otherwise similar immigrants who have managed to escape
housing market discrimination. In this view, it is not the enclave as such that hampers
success in the labor market, but rather that the enclave is located away from
employment opportunities.
The stories based on human capital externalities are also based on residential
segregation. In this instance, however, segregation is not necessarily bad – it all
depends on the quality of the enclave, e.g. the stock of human capital; see Cutler and
Glaeser (1997) and Borjas (1998). If residential segregation implies that skilled
members of an ethnic group live in the enclave, and individuals primarily interact with
members of their own ethnic group, then disadvantaged members such as recent
immigrants gain from living in the enclave.
The conclusion from this brief review is that the causal effect of living in an enclave is
ambiguous in sign. The net effect on outcomes is thus an empirical question. To
determine the net effect, we estimate what must be interpreted as reduced form
relationships between measures of labor market outcomes and, among other things, the
size of the enclave. We will thus not be able to test any of the above hypotheses.
However, we argue that our estimates have a causal interpretation.
6.2  Baseline estimates
In this section we provide estimates of the effects of segregation across municipalities in
a cohort of recent immigrants. We investigate to what extent the share of immigrants
(foreign citizens) in a municipality, and the ethnicity of these immigrants, matter for the
economic outcome of recent immigrants. Since immigrants can choose municipality of
residence, municipal variables cannot be assumed exogenous. Therefore, we will make
use of the settlement policy introduced in 1985 to obtain instruments for municipal
variables. In effect, we use variables pertaining to the initial (assigned) municipality as
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throughout is that the placement policy is independent of unobserved individual
characteristics. Moreover, we assume that location does not have permanent effects on
outcomes.
We employ the following baseline specification
k
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We focus on two outcomes − log earnings and idleness − and standardize for a set of
individual characteristics X, containing gender, age, age squared, marital status,
education, ethnicity, and year of immigration. The outcome for individual i of ethnic
group k is related to four municipal variables (municipalities are indexed by j): 
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other ethnicities than k;  ) 8 ( + t j n  the size of the native (i.e. Swedish-born) population; and
) 8 ( + t j u  the municipal unemployment rate (percent of the population aged 16–64). We
introduce the levels of the population variables in logs, since this provides a more
flexible specification than the perhaps more standard approach of using population
shares.29
We are primarily interested in the effect of changes in the composition of the
municipal population, i.e. changes in 
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and analogously for the probability of being idle.30 For all practical purposes, the
adjustment in (11a) is immaterial, since ( n e ) is such a small number (0.004 on
average). The adjustment in (11b) is material, however, because  n m  equals 0.087 on
                                               
29 In our empirical analysis, the specification in terms of levels fit the data better than the specification in
shares. Also, the qualitative results are similar in both specifications.
30 If we want to get at the latter elasticity we need to divide by the corresponding average probability.IFAU – Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 23
average.31
Motivated by the discussion in section 4, we estimate (10) with a variety of estimation
methods. As we have explained, these methods differ with respect to the underlying
assumptions about the sorting process. To conserve space, we just report estimates of
local unemployment and the elasticities defined in (11a) and (11b) here. The full set of
estimates for OLS and IV are available in the appendix; see Table A2. Hence, we will
not comment on the coefficients on individual characteristics. Let us just note that they
are very similar across specifications.
Earnings
Table 3 reports the results of the basic specification for earnings. The outcome of
interest is defined conditional on having positive earnings. As we go along in Table 3, we
add more sophistication but also more structure. Column (1) reports OLS estimates
where we treat the four local variables as exogenous. Column (2) gives the results of the
IV (2SLS) procedure, which uses the local variables for each immigrant’s initial
placement (in year t) as instruments for current (year t+8) local conditions.32 In column
(3), we present the results from a control function approach due to Garen (1984). The
value of this approach relative to IV is that it allows  ] ) ( [
0
i i i m m E β β −  to depend on 
0
i m .33
Column (4), finally, presents the result of the Heckman (1979) two-step estimator; we
choose the two-step estimator, rather than the FIML estimator, since the former is more
robust to departures from bivariate normality.
According to the OLS estimates we are led to believe that ethnic and immigrant
concentration do not matter for earnings. Unemployment is the only local variable that
is of importance (in the statistical sense) for earnings. A standard deviation increase in
ethnic concentration is associated with an (insignificant) earnings gain of 1.4 percent. 34
The IV estimates, however, imply that these conclusions are premature, since the OLS
estimates on ethnic and immigrant concentration are downward biased by a factor of
                                               
31 Summary statistics for the municipal variables and the individual characteristics of the sample are
reported in Table A1.
32 Estimates where municipal house prices were used as an additional instrument are almost identical to
those reported here.
33 It adds the assumption that the conditional expectations of the individual specific error terms ( α α − i  and
β β − i ) can be written as linear functions of the local variables in t + 8 and t; see Card (1999).
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three to four.35 Interestingly, the precision of ethnic concentration is not much affected
by the IV-procedure. In this instance, a standard deviation rise in ethnic concentration
produces a significant earnings increase of 4.2 percent.















































# individuals 6,418 6,418 6,418 3,492 2,926
Notes: The estimates on ethnic and immigrant concentration are calculated according to equation (11). The
coefficient on local unemployment is the percent change in earnings associated with a percentage point
increase in unemployment. In col. (2) period t values in the assigned municipalities are used as instruments
for (t+8) local variables. In col. (3) we add the residuals from first-stage regression of each of the endogenous
right-hand side variables on all exogenous characteristics of the municipality and individual, together with
interaction terms between the residuals and the endogenous local variables. The first step in the Heckman
two-step procedure includes period t values for the assigned municipalities and individual characteristics.
Variance estimates allow for correlation across individuals residing in the same municipality. The standard
errors in columns (3) and (4) are not corrected for the first stage estimation.
The estimates on ethnic and immigrant concentration are more or less invariant with
respect to variations in the estimation method. The Garen (col. 3) and the Heckman
approach (col. 4a) both produce estimates that are very similar to the IV estimates. The
only difference pertains to the effect of unemployment, where the Heckman procedure
yields decidedly lower point estimates. Thus, for the variables of primary interest, the
fact that stayers − who constitute the prime source of identification in the IV approach −
may be a selected group does not seem to be a problem.
A comparison between the OLS and IV estimates does not yield a correct picture of
the size of the sorting bias. This is so because some (the majority of those still in the
country) of our individuals remained in the locations in which they were originally
placed. An alternative is to compare movers (col. 4b) with any of the estimates that are
consistent. The estimates for movers suffer from sorting bias since there are no
instruments for their present location; however, we can correct for the fact that they
                                               
35 A Hausman test of the exogeneity of the local variables decisively rejects exogeneity. The test statistic is
F(4, 249) = 7.47 (degrees of freedom within parentheses), with a p-value of 0.000.IFAU – Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 25
may be a selected group using the location assigned to them. The comparison between
movers and, e.g., the IV estimates suggests that the bias due to sorting is especially
acute for the estimate on ethnic concentration. According to the estimate in col. (4b) a
standard deviation increase in ethnic concentration decreases earnings by 1.0 percent.36
A word of caution should accompany the control function estimates in column (4)
since they rely on functional form to a great deal. Although our equations are identified
without the non-linear transformation of the inverse Mill’s ratio, some experimentation
with a linear selection term (Olsen, 1980) results in imprecise estimates of the
coefficients on the local variables, which suggests that “true” identification is weak.37
Therefore, we drop the selection correction approach from here on and resort to the
simpler control function approach of Garen, which seems to be less demanding of the
data in this setting.
Throughout the analysis we have assumed that the initial location does not affect
current income. An important issue is whether this exclusion restriction is valid. To
examine this issue we have performed Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions on
slight variations of our basic model. Since our baseline specification is exactly identified
we cannot apply the Sargan procedure directly. Therefore, we amended the instrument
set by including the lags of the original instruments. In general, the parameters of
interest were not affected by altering the set of instruments. Furthermore, the Sargan-
statistics do not reject the estimated models. This result lends support to the identifying
assumption that initial location does not have a permanent effect on earnings.
To sum up this subsection, we have two major findings. First, there is pervasive
evidence that estimates of ”neighborhood” effects that do not account for sorting may be
severely biased.38 Our results indicate that high (unobservable) ability immigrants
locate outside ethnic enclaves to a greater extent. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, immigrants derive a (statistically significant) positive return from living in
ethnic enclaves. There is an earnings gain of four percent associated with a standard
deviation increase in ethnic concentration. We interpret this result as being consistent
                                               
36 A simple OLS regression for movers yields a slightly greater earnings reduction.
37 We have tried adding local variables as well as interactions between individual characteristics and local
variables to the selection equation with essentially the same result.
38 In this sense, our results are similar to Evans et al. (1992), where the neighborhood referred to schools.
Our estimates suggest that sorting is pervasive even when using a more extensive measure of a
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with hypotheses stressing that ethnic enclaves may be associated with, e.g., positive
network effects.
Idleness
Let us proceed to our other outcome measure: idleness. We define those who had no
earnings and did not participate in regular education as “idle”.39 Table 4 reports the
results for linear probability models of idleness. Again, we report the results of different
estimation approaches; this time, however, we drop the selection correction method for
reasons given above.






























# individuals 9,883 9,883 9,883
Notes: The coefficient on local unemployment is the change in the probability associated with a percentage
point increase in unemployment. The remaining coefficients are elasticities, defined analogously to equation
(11), i.e., they give the percent change in the probability associated with a one percent change in each
respective variable. In col. (2) period t values in the assigned municipalities are used as instruments for
(t+8) local variables. In col. (3) we add the residuals from first-stage regression of each of the endogenous
right-hand side variables on all exogenous characteristics of the municipality and individual, together with
interaction terms between the residuals and the endogenous local variables. Variance estimates allow for
correlation across individuals residing in the same municipality. The standard errors in col. (3) are not
corrected for first stage estimation.
A similar pattern arises for idleness as for earnings. The OLS estimate of the effect of
living in ethnic enclaves is biased downward by a factor of three according to the IV and
the control function approach. The point estimate implies that a standard deviation
increase in ethnic concentration reduces idleness by 4.1 percent (1.2 percentage points).
The sorting pattern appears to be analogous to the earnings equation.40 Again, the
results suggest that individuals with high (unobservable) ability choose locales with less
ethnic concentration. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that a simple OLS
                                               
39 Regular education does not include labor market training programs.
40 The variation in idleness is mostly driven by variations in employment. Since employment is increasing
in ethnic concentration, the fact that we are conditioning on employment in the earnings regression does not
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regression for movers suggests that a standard deviation increase in the size of the
ethnic enclave is associated with an (insignificant) rise in idleness of 0.6 percent.
6.3  Are the basic earnings estimates stable?
The baseline earnings estimates presented above are associated with some potential
problems related to model specification and particular features of the data. We have two
main issues in mind. First, the models are estimated using a parsimonious set of local
variables. It may be the case that the effect of ethnic concentration just stems from some
omitted local variable correlated with ethnic concentration. Second, we do not observe
actual placements of refugees. For example, we know that only 90 percent of the refugee
immigrants were actually subjected to the placement policy. Furthermore, if refugees
move within the year of receiving residence permits, we do not observe their
municipality of placement (since we only observe residence at the end of the year). Thus,
our instruments are not valid for all observations in our sample.
In Table 5 we assess the stability of the key parameter by various ways of accounting
for these problems. We start by investigating whether the effect of ethnic concentration
is driven by omitted local characteristics. First, we increased the set of local variables by
including a proxy for local prices (house prices) and the share of employment in
manufacturing; see row (2). This permutation did not have much effect on the estimates;
moreover, the added local variables did not enter significantly in the estimated
relationship. Second, we added the mean earnings of non-OECD immigrants with
similar results (row (3)). Third, we included a set of (23) county dummies to capture
other omitted regional characteristics (row (4)). The results were almost identical to the
baseline estimates. This set of additional estimates makes us confident that it really is
ethnic concentration that drives our results.IFAU –Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 28
Table 5: Stability of the elasticity of ethnic concentration.
Variation Elasticity Standard
error
(1) Baseline estimate .058 (.016)
Alternating the set of controls
(2) Add house prices and industry structure .055 (.016)
(3) Add mean earnings in municipality, non-OECD immigrants .057 (.016)
(4) Add county dummies .057 (.017)
(5) Delete schooling variable .046 (.017)
Weighting (to conform to municipal distribution of other data)
(6) Immigration Board, municipal placement .083 (.022)
(7) Total inflow of refugees .073 (.020)
(8) 1–p, where p is pre-reform distribution (81/83 immigrants) .059 (.017)
Restrictions on the sample
(9) Delete top 8 percent of initial earnings distribution (to conform to
aggregate statistics on immigrant inflow)
.060 (.018)
(10) Only individuals from countries listed as refugee source countries by the
Immigration Board
.066 (.024)
(11) 1989 immigrants only (most likely to be exogenously placed) .056 (.037)
(12) Delete top 10 percent in residual earnings distribution (check if estimate
is driven by high ability individuals being able to choose preferred
location)
.056 (.017)
(13) Delete top 10 percent in residual earnings distribution on the basis of
pre-reform distribution (high ability individuals able to choose, choices
similar to previous immigrants’)
.067 (.020)
Notes: Entries show the elasticity of earnings with respect to ethnic concentration. The weighting procedure
(used in variations under “Weighting”) gives higher weight to observations initially in municipalities where
the probability is higher that the individual was placed by the government. All local variables are treated as
endogenous. The regressions were estimated by IV (2SLS); the instrumentation is explained in Table 3. For
(12) and (13), we predict residuals from an OLS earnings regression like the one in Table A2, but without
local variables.
We now turn to the potential problems related to our data. Since we lack information
on the individual’s refugee status, it is natural to ask whether this produces a
significant bias in our estimates. Of course, we cannot settle this issue completely, but
this section reports some evidence suggesting that this problem does not cause great
concern.
By comparing the number of individuals in our sample with the total number of
allotted residence permits during 1987 to 1989, we conclude that we sample too many
individuals. This leads to the suspicion that some of our individuals may have
immigrated for other reasons than political and, hence, were not assigned a
municipality by the Immigration Board. In particular, some of our individuals may have
immigrated for labor market reasons.
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the number of received refugee immigrants in each municipality. We reweigh our data
such that the distribution of the initial locations of the individuals in our sample
corresponds to the distribution of received refugees over municipalities. One weighting
procedure is based on the number of refugees covered by grants from the Immigration
Board (row (6)). Thereby, we can also address the problem that some individuals may
already have relocated from the assigned municipality when we first observe them. As
an alternative (row (7)), we use the distribution of initial locations from individual data
in another dataset (FLYDATA; see Rooth (1999)). Both these weighted estimates of
ethnic concentration are higher than the baseline estimate.
A second way to handle the lack of data on individuals’ refugee status is restricting
the sample. One idea is that those with the highest earnings during the year of
immigration (period t) are least likely to be refugees; this appears a plausible
assumption given that refugees could live on welfare during their initial period in
Sweden. So, we excluded individuals at the top end of the period t earnings distribution
until the number of sampled individuals was conformable with aggregate statistics (row
(9)). This exclusion produced a reduction of the earnings sample by 8 percent, leaving
the estimate of ethnic concentration essentially unchanged.
Moreover, we have also restricted the sample to individuals arriving from countries
listed as refugee source countries by the Immigration Board (row (10)). This restriction
eliminates a number of small countries in terms of immigrant inflow and produces a
somewhat higher estimate of the effect of ethnic concentration than the baseline
estimate. Thus we conclude that, if anything, the fact that we do not observe refugee
status tends to bias our estimates of the causal effect of living in enclaves downwards.
A related problem with our data is the fact that we do not observe which individuals
were subjected to the placement policy. We know that about ten percent of refugees
chose not to participate in the program, and there is a possibility that some refugees
were able to influence their placement. We have tried various ways to assess whether
this may bias our estimates.41
Our first attempt to alleviate this problem is based on the assumption that, in the
                                               
41 To test whether the missing information on placement in combination with the estimation approach
yields an upward bias in the estimates, we used a “fake” IV procedure. We applied our IV approach to the
pre-program cohort (1981/83). OLS and IV applied to this cohort should give the same estimates. This
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absence of the placement program, refugees would have behaved similarly to previous
refugee immigrants. Consequently, we use the pre-program distribution of initial
location in weighting the estimates (row (8)). Municipalities that received a large share
of immigrants in the 1981/83 cohort, are weighted down relative to municipalities that
received few immigrants. The results are not affected by this weighting procedure.
Another way to try to get at the effects of missing information on placement is to
restrict the sample to those who received their residence permits in 1989. This was
when the placement policy was most restrictive. Also in this case, the point estimates
are virtually identical in comparison with the full sample; see row (11).
The above two robustness checks are based on the assumption that the probability of
being treated (placed) is independent of unobserved characteristics. This is a strong
assumption. A reasonable hypothesis may be that the skilled (in a general sense) are
more able to influence their placement than the unskilled. What does this hypothesis
imply for our estimates? One approach to this question is to delete the educational
dummies from the set of individual controls. The idea is that if the probability of
influencing placement is similarly affected by unobserved and observed skills (i.e.
schooling), dropping education provides information on the sign of the omitted variable
bias. The result of this experiment is that the estimate on ethnic concentration drops
somewhat; see row (6). This suggests that there is no upward bias as a result of the fact
that those with plenty of unobserved skills may have been able to influence their
placement.
Another approach to get a handle of the bias resulting from unobserved skills
influencing placement, is to drop the top of the residual earnings distribution. We have
explored two variants of this approach. First, we dropped the top ten percent of the
overall residual distribution (row (12)). Second, under the assumption that the choices of
location would have been similar to previous refugees, we dropped the top ten percent
using the pre-reform distribution of municipalities as weights (row (13)). These two
sample restrictions gave estimates that were similar and somewhat higher, respectively,
compared to the baseline estimates.
In summary, we have performed a large number of robustness checks and find the
basic estimates to be stable. If anything, the baseline estimates probably understate theIFAU – Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 31
true effect of ethnic concentration.
6.4  Does the return to living in an enclave vary across groups?
Our approach to answering this question is to interact measures of skill with local
characteristics. We have considered interactions with gender, individual education and
region of origin. We found no differences across region of origin, nor between males and
females.42 There were some interesting differences across educational groups however.
Table 6 presents estimates for various educational groups, analogous to those in
Table 3. The effect of ethnic concentration exhibits an interesting pattern. The positive
effect of living in an enclave declines monotonously with observable skill until we reach
the university level. For individuals with the highest education we also estimate a
positive (and significant) effect. It is possible that the latter result is due to cream
skimming by municipal officers (although our previous evidence does not suggest that
this is a major issue). Due to this potential problem and the relative magnitude of the
estimated effects, we are inclined to interpret the results in Table 6 as saying that the
least skilled are the ones who gain most from living in ethnic enclaves.43 This is
consistent with a story that emphasizes that enclaves are associated with ethnic
networks who primarily benefits the least skilled.
                                               
42 The estimate of the elasticity of earnings with respect to ethnic concentration was 0.055 for males and
0.065 for females, with standard errors of 0.023 and 0.025, respectively.
43 Interestingly, this is also the group that gains the least from language acquisition, according to Berman et
al. (2000).IFAU –Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 32






















































# individuals 1,041 1,170 1,220 1,222 922 843
Notes: All regressions were estimated by IV (2SLS). Local variables are instrumented as explained in
Table 3. Robust variance estimates, allowing for correlation across individuals residing in the same
municipality.
7.  Concluding remarks
The main purpose of this paper has been to provide estimates of the causal effect on
economic outcomes of living in an enclave. To this end, we have made use of an
immigrant policy initiative in Sweden, when government authorities distributed refugee
immigrants across locales in a way that may be considered as exogenous. This policy
initiative provides a unique natural experiment, which allows us handle the endogeneity
problem due to individuals’ choice of residence.
Our empirical analysis suggests two principal conclusions. First, we find evidence of
sorting across locations. There is a substantive downward bias in estimates that do not
account for sorting. Second, and perhaps more importantly, when accounting for the
endogeneity of residential choice we find that an increase in ethnic concentration gives
rise to a (statistically significant) improvement in labor market outcomes (earnings and
idleness). For instance, the earnings gain associated with a standard deviation increase
in ethnic concentration is in the order of four to five percent. Further, these gains
appear to be concentrated in the lower end of the observable skill distribution.
We have offered evidence suggesting that ethnic enclaves contribute to an increase in
the level of earnings. This is consistent with the view that the enclave offers a “warm
embrace”, helping immigrants escape the discrimination encountered elsewhere on the
labor market. Another issue is whether enclaves also contribute to earnings
assimilation, i.e., to the rate of change in earnings. It may well be that the warm
embrace is too comfortable so that incentives to move upwards on the job-ladder are
reduced. Recent evidence presented in Borjas (2000) suggests that this indeed is theIFAU – Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 33
case: enclaves decrease immigrant assimilation. However, this evidence potentially
suffers from the Tiebout bias that we have addressed.
Finally, let us note that we have not exploited the full potential of the data. Our
analysis has been based on rather broad geographical units. But ethnic segregation may
vary a great deal within these broader units. During the years of the settlement policy,
refugee immigrants were actually placed directly in an apartment. This fact gives ample
scope for utilizing information on finer geographical units, such as housing blocks.
The questions of whether ethnic clustering affects immigrant assimilation and the
consequences of housing segregation for individual outcomes are of substantial interest.
We have put these issues on our research agenda.IFAU –Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 34
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Appendix





Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Local characteristics
ln (ethnic group) ( e ln ) 5.252 2.110 5.104 2.111
ln (other immigrants) ( m ln ) 9.061 1.575 8.954 1.601
ln (natives) ( n ln ) 11.619 1.226 11.534 1.247
Unemployment rate (percent) 5.885 1.391 5.825 1.404
Ethnic concentration ( ) ( m e n e + + )*102





Immigrant concentration ( ) ( m e n m + + )*102 7.880 3.275 7.761 3.339
Individual characteristics
Earnings -- -- 10.955 1.513
Idleness .292 .455 -- --
Welfare dependency .321 .467 -- --
Stayer .538 .499 .544 .498
Female .445 .497 .447 .497
Age 38.124 8.289 37.437 7.506
Married .592 .492 .624 .484
Kid .514 .500 .560 .496
Education: Missing and < 9 years .214 .410 .162 .369
  9–10 years .185 .388 .182 .386
  High school ≤ 2 years .168 .374 .190 .392
  High school > 2 years .185 .388 .190 .393
  University < 3 years .134 .341 .144 .351
  University ≥ 3 years .114 .317 .131 .338
Region of origin: Eastern Europe .180 .384 .201 .401
  Africa .116 .320 .117 .321
  Middle East .457 .498 .403 .490
  Asia .083 .277 .089 .284
  South America .164 .370 .190 .393
Immigration year: 1987 .260 .439 .276 .447
   1988 .355 .478 .357 .479
   1989 .385 .487 .367 .482
Notes: All variables refer to the situation in t+8. Entries for local variables under the heading “Total sample”
are population weighted. Entries for local variables under the heading “Earnings sample” are employment
weighted. The “standard deviation within country” for ethnic concentration is a weighted average of the
standard deviations within each country of origin.IFAU – Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants 37






































































































Education (missing and < 9 years, ref.)








































Region of origin (Eastern Europe, ref.)
































Immigration year (1987, ref.)
















# individuals 6,418 6,418 9,883 9,883
R-squared .063 .054 .120 .118
Notes: IV estimation by 2SLS using values in the assigned municipalities as instruments for (t+8) local
variables. Robust variance estimates, allowing for correlation across individuals residing in the same
municipality.